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0. Introduction.
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a proper semantics of so-called
"external" negation within the framework of the situation semantics introduced in
Barwise & Perry(1983) and its subsequent works such as Cooper (1984, 1988), Barwise &
Peters (1987), etc. Of particular concern here is presuppositions of negative
sentences.
Thus, in this paper, sentences of the following type will be discussed.
(1) The present king of France is wise.
(2) The present king of France is not wise.
The theory to be developed on the basis of these sentences will be claimed to be
cross-linguistically applicable.
For this purpose, the paper is organized as follows: In section I we discuss the
semantic distinction between internal negation and external negation in language such
as English and Korean. In section II, we will discuss the semantic ambiguity of the
sentential negation. In section III, we examine Seuren's(1988) recent account of
negation and presupposition within the framework of a formal semantics. In section
IV, an alternative account will be provided in terns of the theory of situation
semantics. A summary and conclusion will be given in section V.
I. Internal Negation and External Negation.
In English the notion of semantic sentential negation, or propositional
negation, is discussed,examining sentences of the following types.
(3) Not every student passed the examination.
(4) A child hasn't been born in this town.
(5) It is not true that Mary likes John.
Semantically, negation in each of the above sentences has the whole sentence
under its scope. In (4), the negation word not has a wide scope reading over the
existential quantifier a (child). It is not possible to interpret the sentence in (4)
as the meaning of the sentence in (6).
(6) There is some child who has not been born in the town.
In (5), the phrase 'it is not true' is a netalinguistic expression which is
intended to represent the semantic aspect of sentential negation. Thus, the
propositional sentence itself, as given in (7) below, comes within the scope of
negation.
(7) Mary likes John.
Like this, in English the negation word not semantically has a proposition
within its scope. This fact, however, does not show that English has syntactic
structure of sentence negation.In English, it is considered that there is no one to
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one correspondence between semantic and syntactic sentential negation(Geach
1980[1972]:75; Katz 1977:238; Barwise & Perry 1983:138; Cooper 1988:49; Horn
1989:467,477,487). Thus, such a semantic sentential negation is represented by
translating the syntactic constituent negation into appropriate logical forms. For
example, in (3) the negative noun phrase not every student is considered to be the
negation of the universally quantified noun phrase every student. In (4)
syntactically the verb phrase is negated, but it is interpreted as negating the
quantified noun phrase a child. As already noted, in (5) the phrase it is not true is
a metalinguistic expression (Cooper 1988:50). In other words, in English semantic
sentential negation is obtained from syntactic constituent negation.
Consequently, in English many works on negation discuss the semantic ambiguity
of constituent negation. As simple examples, look at the following sentences. [For
convenience' sake, sentences given in (5) and (7) are repeated here.]
(7) Mary likes John.
(8) Mary does not like John,
(9) Mary dislikes John.
(5) It is not true that Mary likes John.
Here (8) is a natural syntactic structure as negation of (7). Semantically,
however, (8) is ambiguous and can be interpreted either as (9) or as (5). These two
readings say be represented as follows, along with the representation of (7) as (7)
'(Kroch 1975:102).
(7)' Like (Mary, John)
(9)'	 Like (Mary, John)
(5)'	 [Like (Mary, John)
Here, (9)'and (5)' are logically different. (5)', a sentential negation, is
conceptually weaker than (9) 1 , a verbal negation. To put it logically, (7) 1
 and (5)'
are in a contrary relation, while (7) 1
 and (9)' are in a contradictory relation.1
Like this, the verbal negation, a kind of constituent negation, can be semantially
ambiguous. Traditionally, the contradictory negation has been termed Internal
Negation, and the contrary negation External Negation.2
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the following data.
(10)John couldn't solve many of the problems.
(11)John couldn't solve all of the problems.
(12)All of the problems were not difficult.
Although there are differences in grammaticality judgments, it is generally
agreed that these sentences give rise to semantic ambiguity (Lasnik
1975[1972]:24,32,40; Jackendoff 1972:352f; Kroch 1975:65-67). That is, these are
syntactic verbal negation, but semantically they can be interpreted either as
internal negation or as external negation with respect to the quantified phrases.The
interaction between the quantifier and the negation word not nay be represented as
follows.
(13) [=10] a. Internal Negation: MANY (NOT)
b. External Negation: NOT (MANY)
(14) [=11] a. Internal Negation: ALL (NOT)
b. External Negation: NOT (ALL)
(15) [=12] a. Internal Negation: ALL (NM
b. External Negation: NOT (ALL)
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On the basis of these facts we can conclude that in English the syntactic verbal
negation in many cases can have the semantic ambiguity of internal negation and
external negation.
On the other hand, contrary to Horn's (1985:163) unclear conclusion, Korean has
syntactic constructions semantically corresponding to sentential negation. Look at
the sentences in (16) and (17).
(16) a.	 7f	 1314-*	 4-01-t- rf.
	Chelswu-ka	 Mica-lul an cohahan-da.3
Chelswu-Subj Mica-Acc NOT like	 Decl
'Chelswu does not like Mica.'
b. 1j 21=--	 71-	 u14- 14-	 4- 0 1- t }- x 1	 21t-- CI.
Chelswu-ka	 Mica-lul cohaha-ci annun- da.
Chelswu-Subj Mica-Acc
	 like Comp NOT do-Decl
'It is not that Chelswu likes Mica.'
	
(17) a. 3L-ft ZLIA-	 ol	 *	 *oft- q.
motun sonye-tul-i
	 chelswu-lul an cohahan-da.
all girls-
	 Subj Chelswu-Acc NOT like-
	 Decl
'All girls do not like Chelswu.'
b. IL
 
-2:	 -	 o)	 +-	 4-0111–A1	 (atEI.
motun sonye-tul-i
	 chelswu-lul cohaha-ci annun- da.
all girls-	 Subj Chelswu-Acc like- Comp not-do-Decl
'It is not that all girls like Chelswu.'
Syntactically, (16a) and (17a) are VP-negation, while (16b) and (17b) are
S-negation. Considering this fact and other related problems, I (Lee 1989) proposed
two rules, namely VP-negation and S-negation, which were formulated within the
framework of the possible world semantics in the Montague tradition, as in (18) and
(19).
(18) NEGATION: SYNTACTIC RULES:
S13. VP-NEG (Verb phrase negation):
If a e Ply, then Fi3(a) E Ply.
Here, F13( a ) = ani + a .
Condition: a does not include another negation particle 00 (ani 'not').
S14. S-NEG (Sentential negation):
If ci) E Pt, then F14(1)) E Pt.
Here, F 14 ((k) =	 ' + ci-anitza-ta.
Condition: 45' is obtained from 45 by deleting the sentence ender ci
(ta)and changing the final verb into its root form.
(19) NEGATION: SEMANTIC TRANSLATION RULES:
113. F13(a)--q Ax	 a' 1(x)14
T14. Fi4(4)-q--, [(k'
In Lee(1989), using these rules, I demonstrated the detailed derivation and
translation of the sentences in (16). There it was assumed that similar rules might
be postulated for the treatment of English negation. It was also noted that
sentential negation would pose some problems for the recently developed theory of
situation semantics. There, however, I did not try to give a detailed account of
negation in terms of situation semantics. The present paper attempts to postulate
appropriate rules of external (or, sentential) negation within the theory of
situation semantics. Before doing that we will first discuss the problems which need
to be explained in the treatment of external negation.
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II. Problems of Sentential Negation.
The problem is that the rules (S13, S14 and T13, T14) given in (18)-(19) are not
fine-grained enough to account for all the semantic phenomena arising from the
externally negated sentences. More specifically, the above rules cannot
appropriately handle the semantics of the so-called presuppositions. Let us examine
the classical Russell sentences in (1)-(2) [repeated here, for convenience].
(1) The present king of France is wise.
(2) The present king of France is not wise.
According to Russell(1905), by uttering sentence (1) the speaker asserts three
things as paraphrased in (20).
(20) a. There exists a king of France.
b. The king of France is unique in the world.
c. The king of France has the property of being wise.
These three assertions can be represented as in (21).
(21) 3x (KoF(x) A VY (KoF (y) 4-* Cy = x]) A Wise(x))
In this analysis, one can say that the sentence in (1) is definitely false in the
present world because there is no entity in this world that can be truthfully said to
be, at present, the king of France. As for the negated sentence in (2), Russell
claims that it is ambiguous between internal negation and external negation, which
can be represented in logical formulas as in (22) and (23), respectively.
(22) INTERNAL NEGATION: E3x (KoF(x) A VY (KoF (y) +4 Cy == xi)A	 Wise(x))
(23) EXTERNAL NEGATION: --, E3x (KoF(x)
	 VY (KoF (y) 4-÷ Cy == xl)/\ Wise(x))
In the external negation, (23), the negation operator is prefixed to the
positive form of (21). In the internal negation, (22), it is shown that it is
possible to insert the negation operator in other positions in (21). It is generally
agreed that human speakers prefer the reading of this internal negation. In the
internal negation (22), (20a) and (20b) are preserved and only (20c) is negated. On
the other hand, in the external negation, (23), logically the existential import is
negated, i.e. (20a) and (20b). [To put it in other researchers' terns, in (22) the
so-called presuppositions are preserved, while in (23) they are negated.]
As is well known, in the Frege(1892)-Strawson(1956) approach, it is claimed that
(22) is the only possible reading of the negative sentence (2). That is, in their
approach the so-called external negation is not recognized. In the approach, the
positive sentence in (1) is not analyzed as (20). It is claimed that only (20c) is
asserted by (1),and that (21a) and (20b) are claimed to be just presupposed. The
positive sentence in (1) is not formalized as in (21). They claim that when the
presupposition fails, in opposition to Russell, the sentence is truthvalueless. Thus,
in their approach, the only appropriate logical form is (22).
Recent works on the subject of negation (e.g., Kroch 1975, Horn 1985,1989
Linebarger 1987, Seuren 1988, etc.) agree that external negation is ambiguous
depending on whether the so-called presuppositions are negated or not. The rules
given in the previous section do not properly account for this semantic phenomena.5
The rule S14-T14 in (18) and (19), respectively, can treat the simple sentential
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negation, which Is usually referred to as Denial. The notion of denial reading of
external negation say be defined as follows (cf. Kroch 1975, Horn 1985,1989;
Linebarger 1987, etc.).
(24) DENIAL READING OF EXTERNAL NEGATION:
The sentence [not [S]] does not directly comment on the state of affairs but
instead denies the truth of the statement S previously uttered or implied.
Sentence-external negation can be paraphrased as "The sentence S is not
true".(Kroch 1975)6
The translation rule T14 explains this aspect of external negation. It, however,
cannot account for other semantic phenomena concerning presupposition. In the
following section we will examine Seuren's (1988) recent account of the
presupposition phenomena. After that we will devise a theory of situation in order to
account for the phenomena within the framework of situation semantics.
III. Negation of Presupposition.
Concerning presuppositons, Seuren(1988:182) notes two cases, as cited in (25).
(25) a. Presupposition-Preserving Case: In certain constructions negation cannot
cancel presuppositions but has to preserve them.
b. Presupposition-Cancelling Case: In other constructions the only negation
possible is the presupposition-cancelling one.
According to this observation, it is not the case that presuppositions maybe
cancelled. Instead, in some cases presuppositons are preserved, while in other cases
they are necessarily cancelled. Thus, negation of presuppositions cannot be treated
in a uniform way. In other words, external negation itself is ambiguous, hence any
rules of external negation should be postulated in such a way as to reflect this
semantic aspect of presuppositions. To make this point clear, Seuren(1988:190) cites
the following sentences.
(26) a. It is NOT sad that she died so young: she is still very much alive.
b. He doesn't hate SOME of his friends: he hates then ALL.
c. No Johnny, aunt Bessie isn't "SPLITTIG" tomorrow, she is LEAVING.
In (26a), a factive presupposition is denied. In (26b) a scalar implicature is
corrected. In (26c) a stylistic or sociolinguistic inappropriateness is straightened
out. Like this, denials arising from external negation do not seem to form a single
natural class. This fact supports the observation that the rules S14 and T14 do not
correctly account for the semantic aspects of external negation.
Concerning the negation word not Seuren claims that it is semantically
ambiguous. He says, "...in- my analysis, not is LOGICALLY, and hence
TRUTH-CONDITIONALLY, and hence SEMANTICALLY, ambiguous". He makes a distinction
between a minimal negation (--) and a radical negation (). A minimal negation
preserves presuppositions, while a radical negation cancels them. To complete his
logic, he postulates three truth-values, as summarized in (27).
(27) a. TRUE: written 1: All the truth conditions are fulfilled.
b. MINIMALLY FALSE: written 2: Presuppositional conditions are fulfilled, but
not the assertion conditions.
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C. RADICALLY FALSE: written 3: Not even presuppositional conditions are
fulfilled.
Seuren's theory is compared with the classical bivalent logic as in (28).
(28)
Assert M-N R-N Classic
...	 p
-- P "--'	 P --1	 p
1 2 2 2
2 1 2 1
3 3 1 1
Fig I. Seuren's truth table, compared with classical negation.
Now let us look at our earlier examples with Seuren's analysis in nind.[Examples
are repeated here.]
(1) The present king of France is wise.
(2) The present king of France is not wise.
(20) a. There exists a king of France.
b. The king of France is unique in the world.
c. The king of France has the property of being wise.
(21) 3x (KoF(x) A b y (KoF ( y ) 4--* Cy = x]) A Wise(x))
(22) INTERNAL NEGATION: E3x (KoF(x)
	
Vy (KoF (y) H [y = x])A	 Wise(x))
(23) EXTERNAL NEGATION: 	 E3x (KoF(x) A V y (KoF (y) ++ [y ==. )(])A Wise(x))
In Seuren's terns, (22) is a minimal negation, and hence minimally false. (23)
becomes a radical negation when either [[KoF(x)] and [Vy (KoF (y) 4-+ [y == x])]]
does not hold, in addition to the falsity of [Wise(x)]. Seuren does not consider a
situation in which the assertion holds while presuppositions fail. It is of course
difficult to imagine such a situation. Thus, when presuppositions fail the assertion
can also be assumed not to hold. We may compare logics of Russell, Strawson, and
Seuren as follows.
(29)
Case Russell Strawson Seuren
1
...
Assertion: T
Presuppositions: T
T T T
2 Assertion: F
Presuppositions: T
F	 I
,
F M-F
3 Assertion: F
Presuppositions: F
F Valueless R-F
Fig 2. Comparison of negation of presupposition: Russell, Strawsn, and Seuren
As can be seen in Fig.2, Seuren has refined the assignment of truth values, in
accounting for negation of presuppositions. In Case 1. there is no difference. In
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Case 2, there is no difference between Russell and Strawson, but Seuren assigns the
value of Minimally False. In Case 3, the classical difference between Russell and
Strawson is depicted. Furthermore, we can see that Seuren's position is closer to
Russell than to Strawson. Thus, we can conclude that Seuren basically adopts
Russell's logic and revises it in such a way as to add a fine distinction between
Case 2 and Case 3. By doing so, he succeeds in distinguishing the semantic difference
between Case 2 and Case 3. This policy is similar to Strawson's, but their value
assignments are quite different. Semantically, Seuren's analysis is sound since it
does not use such unfounded notion as Valueless. Thus, we can conclude that Seuren
has been successful in providing a fine-grained semantics for the analysis of
negation and presupposition within the traditional model-theoretic formal framework.
Seuren (1988), however, does not give any account of the data given in
(26)[repeated here, for convenience].
(26) a. It is NOT sad that she died so young: she is still very much alive.
b. He doesn't hate SOME of his friends: he hates them ALL.
c. No Johnny, aunt Bessie isn't "SPLITTING" tomorrow, she is LEAVING.
It seems to me that (26a) and (26b) may be categorized into Case 3 in Fig.2
above. Concerning (26a),there seems to be no problem at all with this treatment.
(26b), however,may cause a problem, if we consider the conveyed meaning to be a
scalar implicature. If, however, we take this implicature as a conventional one, then
it can be treated in the same way. If this is correct, then we are left with (26c).
The problem involved in (26c) is purely pragmatic or stylistic, the explanation of
which seems to lie beyond the limit of truth-conditional semantics that is assumed in
this paper. In the following section, we will examine an alternative semantic theory,
i.e., situation semantics, and see if the theory can properly handle all the data
considered so far in this paper.
IV. Situations and External Negation.
In this section a recent version of situation semantics is briefly discussed, as
it relates to the semantics of external negation. In particular, it will be examined
whether the problems of negation of presuppositions may be treated in situation
semantics better than in the Seuren-type formal semantics.
In situation semantics (Barwise 1989:236), situations (or, s's) are taken to be
more basic than facts and other states of affairs (or, soas). In the theory of
situations negative states of affairs are recognized, and it is further assumed that
soas are not always persistent. It is noted that every state of affirs a has a
negation --,cs
In situation semantics, declarative sentences are not talked about as being true
or false. They are regarded as describing situations. As mentioned above, situations
are basic objects which among other things support certain facts. The support
relation is represented as in (30).
(30) s 1==c.
This means that the situation s supports( =) the fact 41. Facts are
situation-theoretic objects. Facts are represented as in (31).
(31) a. (1, like, Mary, John; 1)
b. 0, like, Mary, John; 0)
Let us consider these facts in connection with the sentences in (7) through (10)
above.[ repeated here, for convenience, together with their psudo-logical forms].
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(7) Mary likes John.
(8) Mary does not like John.
(9) Mary dislikes John.
(5) It is not true that Mary likes John.
(7)' Like (Mary, John)
(9)'	 Like (Mary, John)
(5)'	 [Like (Mary, John)
We talk of sentences describing a situation when a certain fact is supported by the
situation. Thus the semantic rules are stated in such a way that the statements in
(32) are TRUE.
(32) a. Mary likes John describes situation s
iff s 1== (1, like, Mary, John; 1).
b. Mary does not like John describes situation s
iff s 1== (1, like, Mary, John; 0) .
Here, (32a) reflects the relation between (7) and (7)', while (32b) explains the
relation between (8)[its (9)-reading] and (9)'. This means that (32) provides the
semantics of a positive sentence and its VP-Negation counterpart. More specifically,
the semantic rules do not say anything about the S-Negation of (8), i.e. the reading
given in (5). This is the sentential negation, or external negation of the sentence
in (8).
In an earlier version of situation semantics (Barwise & Perry 1983), we see the
observation reproduced in (33).
(33) "The simplest form of negation in English is verb phrase negation, rather than
sentence negation. Compare:
[2] A DOG WASN'T BARKING.
with
[3] IT IS NOT TRUE THAT A DOG WAS BARKING.
In [3] there is an embedded sentence, while in [2] there is none. The type of
negation in [2] can easily be handled If VP rules are assumed, as has already
been indicated in an earlier section. But sentence negation is a complicated
matter, not one we take up in detail here. If I say "A dog is not barking,"
this can describe any factual situation in which some dog is not barking at the
location referred to. However, if i say "It's not true that a dog is barking," 
BY new utterance doesn't mean that. Indeed, to ask what situation I am 
describing seems to miss the mark. Rather it seems that my utterance, if 
informative, serves primaril y to preclude certain types of situations, namely, 
those with barking dogs,"  (Barwise & Perry 1983:138; Underline inserted:IHL)
In a recent version of the theory (Barwise & Peters 1987; Barwise 1989),
however, an attempt is made to accomodate sentential negation,which was regarded as
'complicated matter' in the earlier work, as I underlined in their observation quoted
in (33). Their(Barwise & Peters 1987:14) rules are cited in (34).
(34) VP-NEGATION: (s	 el): This asserts that the dual (i.e., contradictory
counterpart) ofd holds in s.
(35) S-NEGATION: 	 (s 1== cl): This asserts that d fails to hold in s.
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The semantic rule in (34) is a generalized and restated version of (32b), namely
a VP-negation. (35) is a new semantic rule which seems to be intended to account for
external negation. In situation semantics external negation is simply taken to be a
denial of the proposition. This position seems to be clear in the following claim.
(36) "...Indeed for most situations s there will be basic states of affairs a
containing as constituents objects with which neither proposition (s 1== cl) nor
(s 1==	 cl) are true." (Barwise 1989:235, fn.21)
This is exactly the denial reading of a sentence, as discussed in the previous
sections. This rule seems to correctly capture the intuition that we quoted in (24)
above, whisk says: "The sentence [not [S]] does not directly comment on the state of
affairs but instead denies the truth of the statement S previously uttered or
implied. Sentence-external negation can be paraphrased as 'The sentence S is not
true'"-8
This rule, however, is not fine-grained enough to account for the different
semantic phenomena that an S-negation may give rise to. We say observe two kinds of
problems. First, the rule cannot capture the fact that the semantic ambiguity of the
negation word not is actually a matter of presuppositions of the sentence. In
particular, the rule does not pick out such a semantic distinction as the one given
in (29) above. According to the situation theory, the Case 2 in (29), i.e.
presupposition preserving case, will be treated as a simple case of VP-negation,
namely rule (34). On the other hand, the Case 3 in (29), i.e.
presupposition-cancelling case, will be simply treated as a case of denial and
handled by the rule in (35). Negation rules of any theory, however, must be able to
capture this phenomenon of negative sentences.
Second, concerning the denial meaning of external negation, the rule in (35)
cannot capture the semantic differences among the sentences given in (26). [repeated
here, for convenience].
(26) a. It is NOT sad that she died so young: she is still very much alive.
b. He doesn't hate SOME of his friends: he hates them ALL.
c. No Johnny, aunt Bessie isn't "SPLITTING" tomorrow, she is LEAVING.
Since the rule in (35) takes the external negation operator as a single denial
operator, it cannot but treat the above three external negation cases as a single
natural class, which is not correct, as we have already observed.
To resolve these problems, I propose that the external negation rule in (35) be
revised as in (37).
(37) S-NEGATION (Revised): (s I= (1, -I (a • A c P )) )
Here, d e means the asserted proposition of a and 'IP
means the presupposition of cl.t1 P may be more than one.
This revised rule provides the following value assignments.
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(38)
Case do cP
1 F T
2 F F
Fig. 3. Possible values of c o and cP.
Comparing Fig. 3 in (38) with Fig. 2 in (29), we can see that Case 2 of (29)
corresponds to Case 1 in (38), and Case 3 in (29) to Case 2 in (38). This is exactly
the expected result. The revised rule can appropriately handle the ambiguity of the
negation word not, as it has scope interactions with presuppositions of the
sentence. When we need to consider a set of presuppositions of a sentence, We can
easily include the set of presuppositions by the mechanism of conjunction. we can
also represent which one of the conjoined presuppositions is negated by a similar
method of the table representation of (38). This can be an efficient way to
accommodate the semantic difference among the sentences given in (26) above.
Furthermore, the revised rule has important conceptual significance. In (24), in
section II above, we quoted a definition of the denial reading of external negation.
In notes 6 and 8, it was mentioned that the position taken in the definition would be
partly rejected. Actually, the definition does not seen to correctly describe the
denial meaning of external negation. Particularly, in the definition, the phrase
"...does not directly describe..." does not seen to be correctly defining the denial
reading. As is expressed in Barwise's comment, cited in (36) above, a speaker is
actually describing a situation in which a proposition is neither true nor false.
The revised rule correctly reflects this aspect of the denial reading by makingia
situation support relevant facts.
Let us reanalyze the data discussed above in terns of the revised rules. Look at
the sentences in (2) and in (20).[repeated here, for convenience].
(2) The present king of France is not wise.
(20) a. There exists a king of France.
b. The king of France is unique in the
c. The king of France has the property
According to the rule given in (37), (20c)
set of cl Ps. Thus, the meaning of sentence
(39).
(1) The present king of France is wise.
(39) The meaning of sentence (1):
a. ct° : (20c)
b. c P: (20a) A (20b)
world.
of being wise.
is d e and (20a) and (2b) constitute the
(1), repeated here, is represented as in
Now, the semantic rule of external negation is formulated as in (40).
(40) EXTERNAL NEGATION: The present king of France is not wise describes situation s
iff s	 (1,	 3x (Wise(x) A [KoF(x) A VY (KoF ( y )	 Br mg Xinnt •9
In addition to this rule, we can easily formulate a semantic rule of internal
negation for the sentence, as in (41).
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(41) INTERNAL NEGATION: The present king of France is not wise describes situation s
iff s 1= (1, 3 x
	 Wise(x) A [KoF(x) A by (KoF (y) ++ [y = X])1)) •
The rules in (40) and (41) may be rewritten as in (42) and (43), respectively,
which are more in the form of situation semantics.
(42) EXTERNAL NEGATION:
The present king of France is not wise describes situation s
iff s 1= (1, 3x [KoF(x) A VY (KoF ( y ) 4-÷ [y = )(M()); 0) and
(1, 3x (Wise(x))(b); 0) .7
(43) INTERNAL NEGATION:
The present king of France is not wise describes situation s
iff s 1= (1, 3x [KoF(x) A V y (KoF ( y) ÷-* [ y	 x]n(b); 1) and
(1, 3x (Wise(x))(b); 0) .
This completes a revision of negation rules of situation semantics, so that they
may properly account for the relevant data.
V. Summary and Conclusion.
The purpose of the present paper was to provide a proper semantics of external
negation within the framework of situation semantics. Of particular concern was to
account for the interactions between the negation word not and presuppositions of the
sentence. To this end, in section I, the syntactic and semantic distinction between
internal and external negation was made and discussed in detail. In particular, an
attempt was made to provide rules of negation in terms of the traditional formal
semantics. In section II, problems of sentential negation were discussed. Simple
denial reading and other presupposition cancelling cases were examined. In section
III, external negation was discussed with reference to the ambiguity of the negation
word not. Particularly, presupposition-preserving and presupposition-cancelling cases
are separately examined. In section IV, in accounting for the observed semantic
phenomena of negation in situation semantics, a revision of previous rules was
proposed.It was shown the revised rules effectively handled negation of
presuppositions.
To conclude, I hope to have shown that, with a minor revision of rules,
situation semantics can provide a set of rules not only for internal negation but
also for external negation. The present paper, however, is not conclusive on the
matter of theory evaluation. Not only the formal semantics of Seuren-type but also
the revised situation semantics were shown to be able to appropriately handle the
semantic aspects of external negation. It is hoped that a further study will
investigate other aspects of grammar in order to provide a more comprehensive theory
evaluation.
Notes
*This is the written version of the paper I presented at the Sixth
Japanese-Korean Joint Workshop on Formal Grammar Theory, held at Sophia University,
Tokyo, Japan, on December 26-28, 1989. I would like to thank Professors Akira Ikeya,
Arata Ishimoto, Akira Ishikawa, Hisashi Komatsu, Chungmin Lee, and Byung-Soo Park,
for their helpful criticisms and comments. I am also grateful to Ms. In-Young Jhee
for her help in preparing an earlier version of this paper.
i That is to say, although (7)' and (5)' cannot both be true, they can both be
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false. On the other hand, (7)' and (9)' can neither be true nor both be false.
2 1n Barwise & Peters' (1987) term, Internal Negation say be termed as
'Complement', while External Negation may be termed as "Dual'.
;Abbreviations: Subj = Subject Particle; Acc = Accusative Particle; Decl =
Declarative Particle; Comp = Complementizer
4Here, the translated expression [-I al functions as asingle predicate, which
corresponds to its positive predicate[e]. This way we can account for such pairs as
button-unbutton, happy-unhappy, etc.
5As will be discussed shortly, the most recent version of negation rules In
situation semantics (Barwise & Peters 1987) has exactly the same problem. The rules
will examined in section IV below.
6This position, however, will be partly rejected in section IV below.
7We may think of another situation, as depicted in the following:
The present king of France is not wise describes situation s
iff s 1 = (1, 3 x [KoF(x) A VY (KoF (y) 4-+ br = xi (b) ; 0) and
(1, 3 x (Wise (x) ) (b) ; 1)
This, however, is an impossible situation. Once the first part does not hold
the second part is automatically supposed not to hold, either. Therefore, (42) is the
only possible situation picking up the reading of external negation.
8As observed in note 6 above, this position will be partly rejected shortly.
9This is a schematic representation of the rule.
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